Objective: To test whether the model of 'diffusion of innovations' enriches understanding of the implementation of evidence-based thrombolysis services for stroke patients. Methods: Four case studies of the implementation of evidence on thrombolysis in stroke services in England and Sweden. Semistructured interviews with 95 staff including doctors, nurses and managers working in stroke units, emergency medicine, radiology, the ambulance service, community rehabilitation services and commissioners. Results: The implementation of thrombolysis in acute stroke management benefited from a critical mass of the factors featured in the model including: the support of national and local opinion leaders; a strong evidence base and financial incentives. However, while the model provided a starting point as an organizational framework for mapping the critical factors influencing implementation, to understand properly the process of implementation and the importance of the different factors identified, more detailed analyses of context and, in particular, of the human and social dimensions of change was needed. Conclusions: While recognising the usefulness of the model of diffusion of innovations in mapping the processes by which diffusion occurs, the use of methods that lend themselves to in-depth analysis, such as ethnography and the application of relevant bodies of social theory, are needed.
Background
The 'implementation gap' into which promising practices have been seen to fall has attracted attention in policy studies for decades. Implementation research has recently been gaining ground in health care, receiving an additional impetus from debates about evidencebased health care. Understanding how innovations, particularly those based on evidence, make their way into practice is critical to effectiveness in health services.
Under the auspices of evidence-based medicine, intervention studies designed to improve the use of evidence, typically through the use of guidelines, audit and feedback, and leadership have concluded that multifaceted interventions are likely to be more effective than single methods. 1 Research contributions have sought to shift attention to context, theory and process. 2, 3 For example, Checkland et al. 4 argue that while general practices identify similar barriers, their underlying processes of 'sensemaking' differed. While barriers can capture a rhetorical and rational account of practice, the importance of context and social relations is often lost. 5 There has been a proliferation of frameworks for the analysis of dimensions of implementation. [6] [7] [8] [9] One review suggested grouping together the various dimensions under the following headings: the nature of the innovation, systems readiness for innovation, the adopter, the implementation process, the outer context and communication and influence. 8 It advocates a move away from linear models of implementation towards richer, more complex, accounts of the process of change including greater consideration of the role of individuals. 10 This 'diffusion of innovations' model provides a framework for analysing implementation. Although the model is not explicitly framed as a 'how to' approach, the domains provide a detailed and comprehensive map of implementation. 11 This study focused on stroke services and the introduction of thrombolysis as a treatment. 12, 13 Thrombolysis is a time-critical intervention, administered intravenously in the first four-and-a-half hours post stroke in line with a strict treatment protocol. Implementation involves coordination between ambulance services, Accident and Emergency and stroke specialists and the recognition by patients and carers of the need for emergency intervention. A literature review reported barriers to its implementation, which included the limited recognition of stroke as a treatable condition, poor triage of stroke patients and delays in critical neuroimaging. 14 Our aim was to use the domains in the diffusion of innovations model to determine whether this enriched understanding of the implementation of thrombolysis in stroke care.
Methods
Four case studies were conducted in two hospitals in England and two in Sweden. The countries were selected, following discussions with European stroke specialists, to represent different levels of development in the delivery of stroke services characterized as highly developed (Sweden) and developing (England). Focusing at the micro level, the sites were selected to include an urban and a rural hospital in each country. The sample in each site included clinical and managerial staff within one hospital, who were working in stroke units, emergency medicine, radiology, the ambulance service, community rehabilitation services and community medicine (see Table 1 ).
The interview schedule was informed by two literature reviews, one based on social science approaches to implementation and one on approaches prevalent in the medical literature. 1 The study centred on questions around evidence, context and facilitation following principles of the PARIHS framework. 15 This framework considers successful implementation to be dependent on the qualities of the evidence that is to be implemented, the nature of the context and the process of facilitation. 16 An early draft of the schedule was piloted with four clinical staff at a London hospital and significant revisions made prior to the fieldwork.
Participants were asked about their professional background and work history, if they used research evidence in their work, and if so why, whether they were encouraged to do so within the Stroke Unit and within the hospital (and if so by whom). Participants were not given definitions of research-based evidence as we wanted to explore their own perceptions. Participants were also asked to give examples of evidence use in practice, to explore their understandings of what research evidence was and how individual and organizational factors affected the use of such evidence.
All 95 interviews, conducted by AF, were recorded and transcribed. Detailed notes were made after each interview to capture the observations and reactions of the interviewer and detailed case study reports were compiled for each site. The interviews were conducted between October 2010 and October 2011. The data were entered into Nvivo and coded. Initial codes were generated from a close reading of the transcripts and were aligned with the foci of the interview schedule. Primary codes related to the nature of the evidence behind different interventions (such as thrombolysis and stroke unit care), the contextual factors which were seen to promote or inhibit uptake by informants and different types of facilitation methods such as audit and feedback, guidelines, leadership and financial incentives. Following team discussions around the interpretation of primary codes, secondary codes were developed and compared with the components of the diffusion of innovations model. Secondary codes included specialist identity development, political manoeuvring and managerial limitations. They were thematically developed with a particular focus around 'nascent concepts' 17 that appeared to lack sufficient explanation in the existing literature. This part of the analytical process was highly iterative and involved going back and forth between the data and the existent literature.
A conceptual model for considering the determinants of diffusion, dissemination and implementation of innovations was used as a framework for further analysis of the data. 10 Data focused specifically on thrombolysis were re-coded using the dimensions of the model. Inconsistencies within or between case studies are highlighted in the text.
Results
The implementation of thrombolysis in acute stroke management benefited from a critical mass of elements featured within the diffusion of innovations model. The following sections present the data relating to three elements of the model chosen to illustrate how its application helped enrich understanding of implementation in terms of how evidence was used and how implementation was accelerated and/or adopted. The final section suggests some limitations of the model.
The nature of the innovation
In the field of stroke care, the historical inability to offer treatments seems to have led to a willingness by health professionals to try something new (described in the model as a tension for change), leading to a high level of system readiness for innovation. Doctors described how they used to admit patients but were unable to do anything for them. Stroke care is a lowprofile specialty, with one participant in Sweden capturing a wider, historical sentiment that 'there is no glamour in stroke.' Thrombolysis, a medical intervention administered by hospital clinicians, was considered to be compatible with the norms of those tasked with implementation:
'I think it's [the implementation of thrombolysis] following the evidence, but it is highly convenient that that evidence supports a medicalised model . . . I mean you could pretty much argue, I think, that the, that the evidence around multidisciplinary stroke unit care has been around for tens of years and yet we haven't done terribly well at implementing it, and where it has been implemented it's generally been implemented relatively quietly. Compare that to the huge big bang effect [for thrombolysis], and this ripples all the way.' (Commissioner, Primary Care Trust, England)
In addition to its compatibility with the medical model of acute care, it was considered to be of relatively low complexity. Furthermore, in Sweden, there had been scope for local involvement in trying out thrombolysis (described in the model as trialability and observability). Swedish participants mentioned their extensive early experience of, and experimentation with, thrombolysis (as collaborators in clinical trials).
There was also evidence of local developments and, where required, local adaptation. One participant in England described how he had gone back to the original studies to check the evidence for thrombolysis with hypertensive patients as he considered that the national guidelines were not sufficiently detailed. Guidance for patients with hypertension was incorporated into the local guidelines. A Swedish doctor described how he had prepared local guidelines to ensure that the key messages were presented in a way that was clear and accessible in 30 minutes. Participants also talked about the value of 'drilling down' into local data and conducting local studies of improvements in, for example, the speed of transfer from the ambulance service to the stroke team.
The main challenge, identified across the four sites, in implementation was the need to offer a 24-hour service. Staff had considered the implications for their working practices and sought and received assurances that the costs would be fully supported:
'So we understood that this would probably increase the number of scans done in the middle of the night, and this has great impact to us as a department, because it means we lose a radiographer for compensatory rest for the following afternoon, and means we cannot necessarily run two full lists, for example, the following day. So we had to know that there would be a prospect of getting more radiographers on board as a result. And I think, and we waited until we had that sort of agreement. So there must have been funding.' (Consultant Radiologist, England) In one of the Swedish sites, the need for 24-hour support for thrombolysis was identified as a challenge to sustained implementation, given the resource and skill requirements.
'. . . one of our great problems is that we need to have that competence, that skill, that flow 24 hours a day, and we don't have our stroke nurses, and we don't have our neurologists here. We don't have -enough money, it's not enough money and it's not enough of personnel to have this high competence every minute you need. So that's of course, if you should be a real effective hospital, you should have this thrombolysis flow or process working at the same way all, every hour and even during the weekends. But it's of course, both an economical problem, mostly, but also that we don't have enough with the doctors and nurses that have that stroke competence that you need.' (Head of Internal Medicine, Sweden) While a number of aspects of the intervention supported implementation, other aspects, such as the need to have a 24-hour service, proved more challenging and required a supportive organizational and wider context.
The outer context
Participants often discussed the impact of a supportive local and national context. It was acknowledged at one of the English hospitals that, by the time their hospital had come to implement thrombolysis, many local clinicians had picked up on the value of thrombolysis through osmosis in their workplace and via external collaboration in networks. The local stroke network was cited as an external driver for change and source of knowledge (including a regional study day on thrombolysis) on the value of thrombolysis and approaches to implementation. However, participants in the two countries described the local development of stroke services differently. In Sweden, participants characterized developments as 'bottom up' and clinically lead, while in England the impetus for change was considered to be more 'top down' -the importance of incentives and mandates, in the form of national guidelines and additional funding were regularly mentioned. Often, at the micro-level, participants talked in terms of the national drive as complementing incentives operating at other levels and supporting local plans for change. A specialist nurse in one hospital commented that 'it was national government, it was region, it was everything, everyone wanted it in place.' Another highlighted the National Stroke Strategy and the pressure put on hospitals to implement it. However, in Sweden, where stroke services were more established, participants were concerned about their ability to sustain the quality of service currently delivered due to resource constraints.
Inter-organizational norms and comparisons figured highly; participants frequently making reference to the national picture and to practice elsewhere in the country, particularly in their own locality. They also discussed the role of national stroke audit data (Rikstroke data in Sweden and Royal College of Physicians data in England) and its impact on practice. ' And also with this RIKS stroke, when you have a quality register, it does make people tick, because you compare and you start phoning each other.' (Medical Auditor, Sweden)
Attitudes of adopters
The role of significant individuals (referred to in the literature as leaders, champions and opinion leaders) was highlighted by participants. The model facilitated an analysis of the positive aspects of leadership in supporting implementation. 'I'm lucky enough to have two very devoted superior doctors at the stroke unit, so they push themselves and they are up to date and they go to congresses here and in Europe, in the US as well. So they push themselves and they inform me, so I don't need to push there. But I have to push in several other areas. But not in the stroke area.' (Medical Director, Sweden) These were not always senior figures and were not only doctors. In one site leadership came from a specialist nurse.
I think it was good that we had the two stroke nurses in post . . . there was good leadership from them. I myself didn't really think down here that the consultant had promoted it, it's been all nurse led. (Senior Sister, England)
Local leaders were also able to see ways in which the additional resources available for thrombolysis could be used to enhance local stroke services more widely. One general manager concluded that 'we are aware that [the thrombolysis service] would give us other opportunities in that their [clinical nurse specialists] time is not always going to be spent doing clever stuff around thrombolysis.'
Personal and professional conflict
Although the importance of leadership is highlighted in the model in terms of communication and influence, adopter characteristics and system antecedents for innovation, which explained the nuanced role of leaders, lay beyond the scope of the model. For example, the impact of personal and professional conflict between key individuals in leadership positions was highlighted at different sites. In one English hospital, colleagues described how two senior doctors involved with stroke services could not get along and work together. As a consequence one had manoeuvred the other out of stroke care decision-making, but the remaining individual could not provide sufficient clinical leadership to promote the thrombolysis service. Thus, despite having a strong team providing effective clinical leadership to the implementation team, leadership was missing at senior management team level where critical, relevant decisions were being made. Here the political manoeuvring and conflict had left a leadership void that was both challenging the implementation of thrombolysis and hard to tackle. An attempt to bring in a new senior doctor failed and the personal conflict between the existing doctors continued to have an impact on the services: ' [At a local hospital they] tried to fill the gap by advertising for a consultant. And they didn't get someone, then they had a problem, because they've got two geriatricians, [they] can't stand one another.
[one] has managed, either by design or by accident, to manoeuvre [the other] almost out of the stroke care arena entirely. But [he] is not a leader of men, and struggles to deliver anything. He's certainly not a champion. A clinical champion.' (Commissioner, Primary Care Trust, England)
In Sweden, participants discussed the corrosive impact of conflict between two senior figures, which acted as a barrier to implementation in one of the hospitals. Participants were describing personal conflicts using expressions such as 'they can't stand one another.' The potent personal feuds we identified are missing from many accounts of implementation and models of the implementation process. Such social relations in health care influence diffusion and may also explain why there are variations in service delivery and outcomes.
Discussion
The diffusion of innovations model provided a detailed framework for mapping key dimensions of implementation. It was also possible to detect an inter-play between different aspects of the model within the case studies. 18, 19 While the compatibility of the intervention with organizational practices and norms in acute care created a tension for change, 20 other aspects proved more challenging and required a supportive organizational and wider context. However, participants highlighted diverse aspects of the outer context that were pushing in the same direction and supporting implementation, including encouragement from national and regional government, and from national and local data. Informal support came through comparison with other hospitals and contact with colleagues within networks. Positive aspects of leadership were also identified in supporting implementation. It was observed that leadership did not always come from senior figures or clinicians, although the extent to which it constituted distributive leadership, including the sharing of power and influence, was less clear. 21 The model used suggests that the fact that an innovation is evidence-based gives it a relative advantage. This was supported in our data, where the strength and quality of the data from the original clinical trials was frequently mentioned. Although the model supported a detailed mapping of critical factors, developing a deeper understanding of factors that seemed critical to implementation meant looking further afield. For example, to understand the role of unprofessional behaviour of senior staff required a consideration of a wide range of relevant organizational and behavioural literature. Fitzgerald and colleagues argue that research that characterize individuals as translators and reinventors does not capture the scope (both positive and negative) of actor involvement in the diffusion of innovations. 19 The role of individuals in the change process has been discussed in terms of the lack of enthusiasm or active hostility of influential clinicians. 22 It is also discussed in the management literature where the 'darker side' of employee behaviour is highlighted. 23 Others have tackled the negative impacts of, for example, personal feuds in the workplace. 24 In understanding the implementation of knowledge, there is scope for greater attention to be paid to the human and social aspects of organizational change. 24 Currie and Suhimlinova highlight the significance of the professions and power in understanding how poor behaviour can continue to affect organizational change in health care organizations. 25 Personal attributes and motivations are often sidelined in analyses of change and are 'explained away' by structural and political factors -while these link to wider organizational structures, processes and politics, they have a life of their own.
Models, like barriers and facilitators, may constrain analysis if used in isolation. Models are illustrative and abstract and as such should not be seen as reflecting the complexities that exist in reality. The lure of the metaphor of barriers and facilitators continues to be strong in health services research, reinforcing a linear model of change that is not sufficiently sensitive to context. 4 A predilection for models (both linear and more complex) also encourages a mechanistic and descriptive mapping of key factors. While detailed mapping can be helpful for descriptive purposes, this is a first step rather than an endpoint for exploratory studies of implementation.
Models should not replace social and political theory in supporting investigations of the implementation of research. There is still potential to draw learning from psychology, sociology and management in the field of research implementation if we are to make sense of the process of change. 9 Others are developing and testing approaches that use theory to construct more nuanced accounts capturing contextual factors. 26 A realist approach which distinguishes between context, mechanisms and outcomes is also attracting attention in implementation research. 27 In particular, a deeper theoretically informed analysis will be critical if we are to understand the potential of individuals to both drive change as inspirational leaders and also to de-rail the implementation process.
